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Załączniki bezpieczeństwa
Załczniki do produktuZałączniki dotyczące bezpieczeństwa produktu zawierają informacje o opakowaniu produktu i mogą dostarczać kluczowych informacji dotyczących bezpieczeństwa konkretnego produktu
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Informacje o producencie
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Osoba odpowiedzialna w UE
Osoba odpowiedzialna w UEPodmiot gospodarczy z siedzibą w UE zapewniający zgodność produktu z wymaganymi przepisami.
The days of 11-13 June, 1982, proved that Arik Sharon’s plan was over-ambitious and adventuristic. Dragging the IDF into the fight with Syrians appeared to be more complicated despite IDF superiority in technology and training. The armoured units were moving too slowly and were stuck in numerous engagements all over the place.
In the Western zone, after several failed attempts to take higher ground and open the road to Beirut, IDF finally made its gain and secured Kfar Sil after a very tough fight that lasted not less than 18 hours.
In the Central zone, after getting the upper hand over the Syrian forces in Ein Zhalta and Jezzine, Israelis continued to crawl towards Beirut-Damascus Highway but the tempo had been lost and it was obvious that the Sharon expectation could not be matched.
In Bekaa Valley, Eastern zone, IDF moved 399 Brigade to the north in order to reach Beirut Damascus Highway in the quickest possible way. That move turned out to be a disaster and one of the worst fights in IDF history. It took tremendous effort of two Israeli divisions to recover the troubled Brigade while suffering losses in men and machines.
Besides the major battles, Israeli forces continued to clear the area while having tough opposition hotspots like Ein-Hilweh and finally, the controversial engagement between IDF anti-tank units and Syrian T-72s.
Polecamy
